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•
Ann Florini
Gupta1 and Mason2 provide a valuable service in highlighting the complex and
contested nature of transparency as a tool of governance. In an era in which in-
formation ºows and information technology play such fundamental roles, and
in which norms about who has the right to know what are so rapidly changing,
transparency clearly deserves its place as, in Gupta’s words, “a key concept of our
times.”
In a slightly earlier version of her paper, Gupta concentrates on the opera-
tional uses of transparency in “governance by disclosure.” She asserts that all
such initiatives reºect a “procedural turn” in environmental governance that as-
sumes that the right process will lead to the right results. She further asserts that
all such initiatives share the assumption that information empowers. But these
are two very different rationales for greater disclosure, and there is no reason to
assume that both are operating in all cases.
Indeed, Mason’s response is largely an argument that what really matters
is who gets to determine what constitutes the “right” process and the “right” re-
sults. And he is quite correct. Disclosure policies can be designed to serve purely
technocratic ends, making governance more efªcient and possibly more effec-
tive without allowing any real shift in power. A public revelation that a local fac-
tory has spilled toxic substances into the local environment may force a clean-
up, without allowing the local populace any say in whether that factory contin-
ues to operate and without creating any accountability for corrupt local ofªcials
who had previously allowed the factory to operate without adequate safeguards.
But Mason goes overboard in assuming that what we have seen so far with
disclosure-based environmental governance is solely a procedural turn with no
impact on power, that indeed it’s merely another way of reinforcing existing
power structures. He claims that there is an unexamined normative agenda of
“scaling back of mandatory environmental regulation (nationally and interna-
tionally), the privatization of environmental resources, and the framing of in-
formation disclosure options in terms of individual lifestyle choices.” Disclo-
sure can be framed as an alternative to mandatory regulation. But it can also be
a form of mandatory regulation, or more likely one of several regulatory tools si-
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multaneously employed. And it can also be used to empower, as India’s experi-
ence leading to its sweeping 2005 right-to-know law attests.3 That law arose out
of multiple grassroots movements in many Indian states, driven primarily by
demands of disempowered actors for information that would enable them to
protect their rights.
The Indian case is one of many examples of a broader normative shift that
Mason does not include in his list: a sweeping turn toward greater disclosure in
many countries and corporations. Twenty years ago a mere handful of countries
had any kind of freedom of information laws, but now some 70 do and the
number continues to rise. Not all are meaningfully implemented, but a sig-
niªcant number are, and several (particularly the Indian and South African
laws) are far more sweeping in their assertions of citizens’ rights than anything
seen in the industrialized democracies. Although disclosure-based regulation
emerged largely in the environmental ªeld (notably with the US Community
Right to Know Act in the mid-1980s) and has gone furthest in that ªeld, part of
the normative context that needs to be considered is this shift toward greater
openness.
For that reason, the discussion is enriched if we look beyond the literature
that deals strictly with environmental governance to see what other strands of
scholarship have to contribute. Most notably missing from the Mason article
and the earlier Gupta piece is any reference to the works of Mary Graham and
her colleagues at Harvard, who have systematically explored exactly the kinds of
analysis that Gupta in particular says is needed on the conditions under which
disclosure has its varied effects.4
Mason is kind enough to cite my introduction to the recent edited volume
The Right to Know. But a deeper look into the book would uncover chapters that
deal exactly with the broader normative questions Mason raises. Richard
Calland’s chapter on the private sector, for example, goes into considerable de-
tail about the potential role of transparency in redressing the loss of democratic
accountability that has accompanied the privatization of services such as water.5
I could not agree more with Mason’s argument that awareness of the
“broader political economy of competing governance norms is necessary to un-
derstand the diffusion and reception of mechanisms for disclosing environmen-
tal information.” Certainly disclosure systems can function in ways that don’t
change existing power structures, or that don’t accomplish much of anything.
Transparency in and of itself is a limited tool. But there is nothing static about
the normative environment, and access to information can help to shift that en-
vironment. Disclosure can be just a small step within an existing system, but it
can also help to transform that system. The few works cited above are just the
beginnings of what I hope will become a much more extensive literature that
can elucidate how, when, and why transparency matters in governance.
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